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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Casey Martin’s story hit the news, it was apparent that whatever resolution 
was reached, it would be met with controversy.  In the words of U.S. Supreme Court, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, 
It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, laid upon it by Congress in pursuance of the Federal Government’s 
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States[]” . . . to decide What Is Golf.  I am sure that the Framers of 
the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland 
prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully 
expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law 
and the links, would once again cross, and that the judges of this august 
Court would some day have to wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential 
question, for which their years of study in the law have so well prepared 
them: Is someone riding around a golf course from shot to shot really a 
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golfer?  The answer, we learn, is yes.  [I]t will henceforth be the Law of 
the Land, that walking is not a “fundamental” aspect of golf.1 
As you can see, the controversy did not stop at the steps of the Supreme Court.   
Martin is a professional golfer in his twenties who is stricken by Klippel-
Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome.2  This disability makes it medically impossible for him 
to play golf without the use of a golf cart.3  The pain and swelling that results from 
sustained periods of walking only slightly subsides when Martin elevates his leg.4  
Using a golf cart provides only minimal relief from the pain Martin suffers while 
golfing; indeed, he suffers pain even while he is at rest.5 
Martin sued the PGA Tour in 1997 after his request to use a golf cart in a tour 
event was denied.6  Martin made this request just prior to the third stage of PGA 
qualifying school in Grenelefe, Florida, in which competitors are precluded from 
using golf carts.7  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon allowing 
Martin to use a golf cart for PGA events.8  The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.9 
                                                                
1PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
2Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d 532 U.S. 661 (2001).  
Although both the District Court and Ninth Circuit refer to Martin’s affliction as Klippel-
Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome (“KTW”), that is a term no longer in use in the medical 
community.  Website of Sturge-Weber Foundation, at http://www.sturge-
weber.com/aboutkt.htlm.  KTW was renamed to avoid confusion with Parkes-Weber 
Syndrome.  Id.  Martin’s disease is correctly identified as Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome 
(“KT”), which is medically “characterized by a triad of signs: Port Wine Stain (capillary 
malformations) covering one or more limbs, vascular anomalies, usually venous varicosities or 
malformation and hypertrophy (enlargement of the limb) or atrophy (withering or smaller 
limb).  Id.  KT involves the lower limbs in about ninety percent of the patients; in rare 
instances, there is an absence of Port Wine Stain and not all three abnormalities need always 
be present for the syndrome to exist.  Id.  Each case of KT is different, with patients having 
varying abnormalities and severity.  Id.  Other associations with KT can include internal organ 
involvement, hematuria (blood in the urine), rectal bleeding and vaginal bleeding.  Website of 
Sturge-Weber Foundation, supra.  Bleeding from an abnormal lesion on the affected limb is 
also common.  Id.  Patients may have sometimes including anemia, coagulation problems 
(blood clots) and platelet trapping in the affected limb.  Id. 
3Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998), aff’d 204 F.3d 994 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
4Id. 
5Id. at 1243. 
6Martin, 204 F. 3d at 996. 
7Id. For a timeline that chronicles Martin and other similar cases, see Dahlia Lithwick, The 
Wheels of Justice, GOLF J., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 22. 
8See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994. 
9See generally PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661. 
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In a similar case that attracted much less media attention, professional golfer 
Ford Olinger was also denied use of a golf cart in a professional golf event.10  
Olinger, who “suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, a degenerative [hip] 
condition that significantly impairs his ability to walk,”11 requested the use of a golf 
cart for play in qualifying rounds that proceed the 1998 United States Open.12  The 
United States Golf Association (“USGA”), which conducts the US Open, denied 
Olinger’s request, and Olinger thereinafter sued the USGA in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.13  After initially allowing Olinger 
to compete in the qualifying rounds, the District Court, and subsequently the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, denied Olinger the use of a golf cart in events 
governed by the USGA.14  Recently, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling.15 
Considering that both golfers’ claims were under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the facts and circumstances are almost identical in each 
case,16 the opposite holdings reached by the courts of appeals is confounding.  
Equally perplexing is the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin.  This note will 
indicate how the enlightened District Court for the Northern District of Indiana 
correctly decided, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed, 
the Olinger matter.  It will also highlight some of the many flaws in the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Martin. 
This Note begins that task by giving, in Part II, a brief background of the ADA.  
Part III closely examines the interpretation of the ADA that the District Court, the 
Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court engaged in while deciding Martin.  Part IV 
provides a similar examination, except of the Seventh Circuit’s and the District 
Court’s interpretation in Olinger.  Part V explains how Martin and Olinger, as 
professional golfers, do not meet the statutory definition of “disabled.”  Part VI 
examines why athletics, by their nature, should not be governed by the ADA.  Part 
                                                                
10See generally Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), reh’g 
denied, reh’g en banc denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14464 (June 22, 2000), vacated, 
remanded 532 U.S. 1064 (2001), on remand, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20379 (7th Cir. 2001). 
11Id. at 1001.  Bilateral vascular necrosis, also referred to as osteonecrosis or aseptic 
necrosis is “a disease that results from poor blood supply to an area of bone causing bone 
death.  This is a serious condition because the dead areas of bone do not function normally, are 
weakened, and can collapse. . . .”  Website of Medfacts SportsDoc, at 
http://www.medfacts.com/d_avn.htm.  The affliction can be caused “by trauma and damage to 
the blood vessels that supply bone its oxygen.  Other causes of poor blood circulation to the 
bone include an embolism of air or fat that blocks the blood flow through the blood vessels, 
abnormally thick blood (hypercoaguable state), and inflammation of the blood vessel walls 
(vasculitis).”  Id. 
12Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001. 
13Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff’d, 205 
F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000). 
14Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001. 
15See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001) (granting certiorari and 
vacating Seventh Circuit decision based on PGA Tour v. Martin). 
16See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994; Olinger, 205 F.3d 1001.  
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VII concludes this Note by arguing that the Supreme Court should have followed the 
reasoning of the Olinger courts and the logical analysis of dissenting Supreme Court 
Justice Scalia, thereby denying Martin’s and Olinger’s ADA claims and preventing 
the ADA from being applied to the substantive rules of competitive athletics. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF ADA 
The stated purpose of the ADA, as set forth by Congress, is to provide a 
“mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities[,]” to establish “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards 
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities[,]” and to ensure the 
federal government’s central role in enforcing these standards while invoking the 
sweep of congressional authority.17 
When instituted in 1990, the ADA “expand[ed] the basic protections of Titles II 
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 beyond prohibiting considerations of 
personal characteristics such as race, religion, sex, or national origin . . . to 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical or mental disabilities.”18  Thus, 
persons with disabilities victimized by discrimination were extended a cause of 
action similar to that already available to members of other minority groups. 
Congress found that an increasing number of Americans have one or more 
physical or mental disabilities, estimating that number at forty-three million in 
1990.19  Additionally, Congress found that our society isolates disabled individuals, 
and discriminates against them in the areas of “employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, . . . and 
access to public services.”20  Also, unlike persons discriminated against based on 
their race, color, sex, national origin, religion or age, persons discriminated against 
based on a disability often have had no avenues through which to pursue a legal 
claim.21  There was a need for such a claim based on Congress’ findings that disabled 
persons regularly encounter various forms of discrimination, “including outright 
intentional exclusion, the . . . effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers, . . . exclusionary qualification standards and criteria . . . and 
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other 
opportunities[.]”22 
The various provisions of the ADA include the following:  Title I deals with 
employment issues, and is designed to prevent employers with fifteen or more 
employees from discriminating on the basis of disability with respect to the terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment, which includes, but is not limited to 
hiring, discharge, and promotion.23 
                                                                
1742 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). 
18Wayne L. Anderson & Mary Lizabeth Roth, Deciphering the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 51 J. MO. B. 142, 142 (1995). 
1942 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Id. § 12112. 
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Title II is focuses on public services, such as transportation services provided by 
a state or local governments.24  Its purpose is to prohibit discrimination by reason of 
disability in regards to the benefits of services, programs, or activities provided by a 
public entity.25 
Title III deals with public accommodations and services that are owned or 
operated by private entities.26  Its purpose is to ban discrimination against disabled 
individuals in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by 
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 
accommodation.”27 
Title IV of the ADA is titled “Telecommunications,” and provides regulations 
applicable to the telephone and broadcast media.28  The purpose of this section is to 
make media accessible to speech and hearing impaired persons through items such as 
the Telecommunications Device for the Deaf—commonly known as TDD—and 
close-captioned television programs.29 
Title V denotes several miscellaneous provisions, including that homosexuals, 
bisexuals, and transvestites are not disabled for purposes of this Act.30  Title V also 
excludes individuals who engage in the illegal use of drugs from the definition of 
disabled.31  Additionally, Title V delineates a claimant’s alternative means of dispute 
resolution,32 and remedies, which include attorney’s fees.33 
Titles II, IV and V are beyond the scope of this Note; however, a close 
examination of Titles I and III follows in the discussion of Martin and Olinger, as 
they are the provisions at issue in each case. 
III.  MARTIN V. PGA TOUR 
A.  District Court Decision 
Casey Martin brought his ADA claim in the District Court for the District of 
Oregon.34  Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Coffin presided in the District Court; he 
                                                                
24Id. § 12132. 
25Id. 
26Id. § 12182. 
27Id. 
2847 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).  
29Id. 
30Id. §§ 12211, 12208 (1994). 
31Id. § 12210. 
32Id. § 12212. 
33Id. § 12205. 
34Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998), judgment entered, 994 F. 
Supp. 1242. 
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wrote each of the court’s two opinions.35  The court examined Martin’s plight, which 
was his attempt to gain membership to the PGA Tour, or the Nike Tour36—a “minor 
leagues” also operated by the PGA—by competing in a three-stage qualifying school 
tournament.37  The qualifying school is set up in stages: 
The first stage consists of 72 holes.  Those who score well enough in this 
stage advance to the second stage consisting of 72 holes.  The top 
qualifiers, approximately 168 players, advance to the third and final stage 
consisting of 108 holes. . . .  [¶] In the first two stages of the qualifying 
tournament, players are permitted to use golf carts.  In the third stage, as 
well as on the regular PGA Tour and Nike Tour, players are required to 
walk. . . .38 
As noted above, Martin suffers from a debilitating disease that “curtails blood 
circulation in [his] leg.  This condition has resulted in significant atrophy in the 
lower leg and bone deterioration of the tibia . . . substantially limit[ing] his ability to 
walk.”39  Thus, Martin asserted, by not allowing him to use a golf cart in the third 
round of the qualifying school tournament, and subsequently on the PGA and Nike 
Tours, the PGA is violating the ADA by not allowing him access to its 
tournaments.40 
Subsequent to his suit, the court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the 
PGA to allow Martin to use a golf cart during the third stage of the qualifying school 
tournament.41  As a result, the PGA lifted its no-cart rule as it applied to all 
competitors, and after Martin qualified for play on the Nike Tour, the parties 
stipulated to extending the injunction to the first two Tour tournaments.42 
Martin’s three claims against the PGA were:  First, under Title III, Martin 
claimed that the PGA is a private entity that either is a place of public 
accommodation, or operates a place of public accommodation.43  Thus, Martin 
claimed that the PGA is in violation of the ADA by discriminating on the basis of 
disability in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
                                                                
35Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.  Judge Coffin ruled on two issues on the parties’ motions 
for summary judgment: (1) the PGA is not exempt from the ADA because it does not qualify 
as a “private club” under the statutory definition; and (2) the golf courses that the PGA uses 
for its tournaments do meet the definition of “public accommodation” under the ADA.  Id.  
The court conducted a bench trial to dispose of the remaining issues. 
36The Nike Tour is now known as the Buy.com Tour.  Subsequent references to that tour 
will be “Nike Tour.” 
37Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1321. 
38Id. at 1321-22. 
39Id. at 1322. 
40Id. 
41Id.  
42Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1322. 
43Id. 
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privileges, advantages, or accommodations” of the PGA Tour.44  Second, Martin 
claimed that PGA is a “private entity that offers examinations. . .related to licensing, 
certification, or credentialing for professional. . .purposes.”45  Thus, they are subject 
to the ADA requirement that such activity be done in a place and manner accessible 
to persons with disabilities.46  Martin’s third claim was, as an employer, the PGA is 
“prohibited from discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”47 
The PGA challenged Martin’s claims, and countered with three defenses, each of 
which was given thorough analysis in the court’s disposition of the motions for 
summary judgment.  Its first is that it is statutorily exempt from the ADA because it 
is a private nonprofit establishment.48  The PGA argued in the alternative that, even 
if it did not qualify for the private club exemption, its tournaments did not meet the 
definition of “places of public accommodation,” and that the PGA and Nike Tours 
are not examinations or courses.49  The PGA also argued that contrary to the third 
count of Martin’s complaint, he is not an “employee” of the PGA or Nike Tours.50 
Two issues were disposed of summary judgment: (1) whether the PGA is a 
private club, exempt from the ADA, and (2) whether the PGA is a public 
accommodation, thus being governed by the ADA.  The court’s analysis of each is 
discussed below.  A bench trial followed, in which the remaining issues were 
disposed. 
1.  Motions for Summary Judgment 
The Martin court’s disposition of the motions for summary judgment ruled on the 
issue of whether the PGA is exempt from the ADA as a private club,51 and whether 
the PGA is, or operates, places of public accommodation.52  Judge Magistrate Coffin 
declined to rule on whether Martin is an employee of the PGA, and whether the Tour 
is a course or examination, deciding that those issues should be disposed of at trial.53 
The issue of ADA exemption based on the PGA’s contention that it is a private 
club was disposed of in Martin’s favor by the court, noting that “[b]ecause of the 
importance of these laws, [the ADA and Civil Rights Act of 1964,] exemptions are 
narrowly construed and the burden of proof rests on the party claiming the 
                                                                
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Id. 
47Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. 
48Id. 
49Id. 
50Id. 
51Id. at 1326. 
52Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. 
53Id. 
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exemption.”54  In its analysis, the court balanced PGA membership—relatively 
small—against its purpose—to generate revenue for its members—in determining 
that the PGA is not exempt as a private club.55  It compared Martin’s case to Welsh v. 
Boy Scouts of America,56 which “found that the Boy Scouts was indeed a private club 
notwithstanding its membership total of five million scouts.”57  The Welsh court 
further asserted that: 
Just as the large membership in the Scouts did not deprive the 
organization of its private club status when its membership requirements 
were fitted with the purpose of the group, so the relatively small 
membership of the PGA Tour does not confer private status on [it] when 
its selectivity is counterbalanced with the Tour’s purpose.58 
Citing Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union59 and Webster’s Dictionary, the 
Martin court stated that “[g]enerating revenue for members scarcely seems to qualify 
as the type of protectable interest Congress had in mind when it excluded private 
clubs from coverage under the ADA and Civil Rights Act.”60  The Martin court 
compared the PGA to a credit union or auto club, which “are not clubs in any sense 
of the word.”61 
The Martin court then presented a detailed analysis of seven factors from United 
States v. Landsdowne Swim Club,62 which are regularly used to determine whether an 
organization is a bona fide private club.63  After its weighing of these factors, the 
Martin court determined that the PGA is not a private club subject to ADA 
exemption; the factors are:  (1) genuine selectivity; (2) membership control; (3) 
history of organization; (4) use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) club’s purpose; (6) 
whether the club advertises for members; and (7) whether the club is nonprofit.64 
The Martin court’s analysis of these factors, in turn, found that, although the 
PGA is selective in its membership, like a club, the selectivity is not based on 
“social, moral, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs, or any other . . . freedom of 
                                                                
54Id. at 1323 (citing Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 101 (4th Cir. 1968); Quijano v. 
Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
55Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. 
56993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).  The court noted that Welsh stated a claim under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964; however, the “ADA and the Civil Rights Act are interrelated in terms and 
application,” so the Welsh analysis is useful.  Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324 n.3. 
57Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
58Id. 
59617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a credit union was not exempt from Title VII 
coverage under the “private membership club” exception). 
60Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
61Id. 
62713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that swim club was not a private club, but 
rather a place of public accommodation). 
63Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. 
64Id. at 1324-25. 
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association values which are at the core of the private club exemption. . . .”65  On the 
contrary, the court found that the PGA’s selectivity is based entirely on skill; such 
“selectivity is inherent to athletics, and does nothing to confer privacy to the 
organizations to which professionals matriculate.”66  
The Martin court noted that although the membership does have voting rights, it 
does not vote on new members; rather, the new members play their way in.67  The 
court neglected to note, however, that to enter qualifying school, the PGA does 
require each potential member to submit two letters of recommendation from the 
current membership, rendering it exclusive in that regard.68 
Additionally, the Martin court found that since the PGA was formed prior to the 
ADA and Civil Rights Act, it is indeed bona fide, but that doesn’t necessarily mean 
it’s private.69  The court relied on the significant need for public participation—
through personal attendance and television audiences—in generating PGA Tour 
revenue, thus this factor cuts against private club status, as does the Tour’s purpose, 
which is discussed above.70 
The court dismissed as irrelevant the advertising factor under Landsdowne, 
noting that the PGA receives extensive media coverage, like most of professional 
sports, thus it need not advertise for golfers.71  The PGA is a nonprofit corporation; 
however, the court found that fact outweighed by the commercial interest of 
generating revenue for its members.72  Thus, remarkably, this final Landsdowne 
factor, as with the others, also cut against a “private club” finding, according to the 
court.73  Accordingly, the court ruled that the PGA is not entitled to the private club 
exemption under the ADA.74 
The second issue before the Martin court was whether the PGA operates a place 
of public accommodation at the golf courses on which it conducts tournament play.  
The PGA’s contention was that the courses used are not open to the public during the 
course of tournament play; thus, the events do not meet the definition of “places of 
public accommodation” under the ADA.75  Title III of the ADA requires that 
reasonable modifications be made to accommodate disabled persons using places of 
public accommodation.76 
                                                                
65Id. at 1325. 
66Id. 
67Id. 
68PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 661. 
69Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
70Id.; see also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
71Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. 
72Id. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. at 1326. 
7642 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994). 
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The ADA denotes a list of specific “public accommodations.”  The list includes:  
gymnasiums, health spas, bowling alleys, golf courses, or “other place[s] of exercise 
or recreation.”77 
The PGA argued “that its courses are only places of public accommodation in 
those areas actually accessed by the public at large.  It contend[ed] that since the 
public gallery is not allowed inside the playing area, the fairways and greens of its 
golf courses are not places of public accommodation.”78 
The Martin court dismissed the PGA’s contention with two separate assertions; 
first, stating that the PGA’s argument would render the “private club exemption” 
irrelevant.79  It made the claim that if a club was not found to be a “bona fide private 
membership club,” as the PGA was, “it could nonetheless refuse to accommodate 
any handicapped members by pointing out it only admits the country club’s members 
(and not the public at large) on its grounds.”80 
A second assertion made by the court is that the statute does not support the 
concept of “zones of ADA application.”81  The PGA referred to: 
cases wherein private facilities do not lose their exempt status on the 
private portions of its facilities simply by operating a discrete public 
accommodation area (e.g., a private country club renting space to a private 
day care center open to non-members has ADA obligations only with 
respect to the day care center, according to [Department of Justice] 
regulations).82 
The court did not see the logic in this proposition by the PGA, and dismissed 
what it called “hop-scotch” areas of ADA enforcement.83  The court analogized the 
Martin scenario to many other sports-related scenarios, including the dugout of a 
baseball stadium, executive suites at an arena, caddies used by professional golfers, 
and scenarios totally unrelated to sports, including reception halls, convention 
centers, and private schools,84 failing throughout to recognize that there is no 
competitive aspect in the latter examples as there is in professional golf. 
In accordance with the above exploration of the Martin court’s analysis, the court 
rejected the PGA’s assertion that the ADA does not apply to the competitive areas of 
a golf course during PGA tournaments.85  And, this rejection, coupled with the 
court’s disposition of the PGA’s prior defense, resulted in the court denying the 
PGA’s motion for summary judgment.86  Accordingly, the court granted Martin’s 
                                                                
77Id. § 12181(7)(L). 
78Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1326. 
79Id. at 1326. 
80Id. 
81Id. at 1327. 
82Id. at 1326. 
83Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. 
84Id. 
85Id.  
86Id. 
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motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of whether the PGA qualifies for 
a private club exemption from the ADA and whether it operates a place of public 
accommodation.87 
2.  Bench Trial 
Judge Magistrate Coffin’s bench trial opinion rendered judgment on the 
remaining issues.88  The first is whether Martin is an employee of the PGA, thereby 
triggering a Title I claim under the ADA.89  That issue, as well as the second issue, 
whether the Nike Tour is a “course or examination” under the Act, were rejected by 
the court without an explanation of its own.90  The court referred to, incorporated 
into its opinion, and thereby endorsed, the PGA’s brief in support of summary 
judgment on those two issues.91 
However, the remaining issues are discussed in detail in the court’s opinion.  
These issues are whether the accommodation that Martin requires—a golf cart—
would either fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament, or result in an undue 
administrative hardship being placed upon the PGA, neither of which is required by 
the ADA.92  The court stated that since it determined Martin to be an independent 
contractor—and not a PGA employee93—the court’s focus would be on whether 
Martin is entitled to the accommodation based on the “fundamental alteration” issue, 
rather than the undue hardship issue, which it said was appropriate for 
employer/employee relationships.94 
The court began its analysis of said issues with illustrations of what it considered 
“fundamental alterations” of an entity’s business or programs in response to the 
needs of disabled persons.95  For instance, the court stated that if a blind customer 
requests Braille books from a bookstore that normally does not carry such books, 
“such an accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of its business.”96  
The court also recited an example of “fundamental alteration” given by the PGA:  If 
a day care center does not normally provide individualized care—one adult for each 
                                                                
87Id. 
88Id. at 1242. 
89Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247. 
90Id. 
91Id. at 1247 n.7. 
92Id. at 1244. 
93The court did not reveal how it determined Martin was an independent contractor, other 
than to state he is not an employee of the PGA, preferring to keep that a secret.  See id. at 1247 
n.7; id. at 1245 n.2.  However, exclusion from one category does not automatically mean 
inclusion in another.  Some statutes only apply to employers that employ a certain number of 
employees.  By the same logic, would those “employers” automatically acquire another 
statutory definition, just because they failed to meet the statutory definition of employer?  Of 
course not. 
94Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 n.2. 
95Id. at 1245. 
96Id. (citing 28 CFR Ch. 1 Pt. 36, App. B at 632 (July 1, 1997)). 
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child—and a disabled child requests such an accommodation, the day care center is 
not required to give such care because it would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service that the center provides.97 
The court next reviewed appellate case law regarding the application of the ADA 
to sports programs.  It first examined two Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cases that 
upheld Michigan High School Athletic Association’s (MHSAA) eligibility 
requirements, McPherson v. MHSAA,98 and its predecessor, Sandison v. MHSAA.99  
In McPherson, the court considered the MHSAA’s rule that limits athletic eligibility 
for student-athletes to eight semesters of interscholastic competition.100  McPherson 
ruled that even though the plaintiff had a learning disability that prevented him from 
completing high school in eight semesters, the rule was necessary, in part, to “limit 
the level of athletic experience and range of skills of the players in order to create a 
more even playing field for the competitors….”101  The Sandison court held like 
McPherson, that “individually determining whether each older student possessed an 
unfair advantage was not a reasonable accommodation,”102 while holding that 
waiving an age regulation would fundamentally alter the athletic program.103 
In Pottgen v. MSHAA,104 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also determined that 
the “age requirement was essential to the high school athletic program and that an 
individualized inquiry into the necessity of the requirement [in each] case was 
inappropriate.”105 
The Martin court then briefly reviewed three district court cases cited by the 
PGA, all of which made determinations on the eligibility of competitors based on 
individualized inquiries.106  Based on this limited application of ADA law to 
athletics, 
the PGA asserts that the court should focus on whether an athletic rule is 
“substantive”—i.e., a rule which defines who is eligible to compete or a 
rule which governs how the game is played.  If it is [substantive] ... the 
rule cannot be modified without working a fundamental alteration of the 
                                                                
97Id. 
98119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997). 
99Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
100Id. (citing McPherson, 119 F.3d at 456). 
101Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245, n.4. 
102Id. (citing Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037). 
103Sandison, 64 F.3d 1026. 
10440 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). 
105Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245 (citing Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930). 
106Id. at 1245 (citing Johnson v. Florida High School Athletic Activities Ass’n 899 F. 
Supp. 579 (M.D. Fl. 1995), vacated as moot 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); Dennin v. Conn. 
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn 1996), vacated as moot 94 F. 
3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 
1997)). 
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competition, and the ADA consequently does not require any 
modification to accommodate the disabled.107 
The court, however, noted that all of the cases cited by the PGA to support its 
position examined the purpose of the rule in question to determine if the 
modification was reasonable.108 
The Sandison and McPherson courts noted that the purpose of the eligibility rule 
is closely tied to the purpose of interscholastic athletics.109  Martin summed up that 
purpose as “allow[ing] students of the same age group to compete against each 
other.”110  Allowing the learning disabled plaintiffs to compete, according to Martin, 
would “fundamentally alter[] the nature of the services at issue.”111  The court 
claimed that the skill level of the plaintiffs is irrelevant; high school athletics are 
only for students in the fourteen to eighteen years age group.112  Additionally, the 
court in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Association ruled that a waiver of the 
curriculum requirement for college athletes at issue there would alter the 
fundamental nature of the program, by allowing unqualified students to compete.113 
The Martin court, however, stated that athletic associations do not have 
unfettered discretion in this area of rulemaking, illustrating that a rule prohibiting the 
use of corrective lenses during competition would not be immune from the ADA just 
because it would alter a rule of competition.114  The court conceded that the PGA 
Tour, and professional sports in general, enjoy a high profile, and possess a high 
level of skilled competition, but claimed that the analyses of ADA questions do not 
change from the high school to professional sports level.115  “[I]f it is unreasonable to 
accommodate Casey Martin’s disability with a golf cart at the PGA Tour level 
because of its rules of competition, it is equally unreasonable to so accommodate a 
similarly disabled golfer at the high school level if the same rules were 
applicable.”116 
Additionally, the court found no difference in ADA enforcement between 
athletics than any other area, stating:  “[T]he disabled have just as much interest in 
being free from discrimination in the athletic world as they do in other aspects of 
everyday life.”117 
                                                                
107Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246. 
108Id. 
109See supra notes 98-103, and accompanying text.  
110Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1246.  
111Id. 
112Id. 
113Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 459, cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1245. 
114Id. at 1246.  How severe would a sight-impairment have to be to qualify as a disability 
under the ADA?  In other words, is the example given by the court even relevant to the 
discussion of this issue? 
115Id. 
116Id. 
117Id. 
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The court next provided an overview of the ADA, and how it applies to this case, 
concentrating specifically, and appropriately, on Title III.118  It noted that Martin has 
the burden of demonstrating that he is disabled,119 and that a modification was 
requested and that the modification was reasonable.120  The PGA received his request 
for a golf cart, and the court stated “the use of a golf cart is certainly not 
unreasonable in the game of golf.”121 
The evidence, the court argued, demonstrating that the use of a golf cart is 
reasonable is that the Rules of Golf do not require walking; and the PGA Tour does 
not require walking on its Senior Tour, or for the first two rounds of its qualifying 
school competition.122  In those two types of tournaments, the PGA does not 
handicap or penalize competitors that choose to use a golf cart.123 
Johnson v. Gambrinus Co. is followed by the court in determining whether the 
modification—golf cart—is reasonable.124  Gambrinus ruled that an ADA plaintiff 
must first show that the modification requested is generally reasonable.125  So, Martin 
first had to show that golf carts are reasonable in golf, generally, without regard to 
the PGA Tour itself.  Thus the court found that the permitted use of golf carts at 
levels of inferior competition, i.e., Senior PGA Tour and PGA qualifying school, are 
“compelling evidence that even the PGA Tour does not consider walking to be a 
significant contributor to the skill of shot-making.”126  Additionally, the court cited 
the fact that the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the Pacific Ten 
Conference allow golf carts to be used by disabled golfers as evidence to meet the 
plaintiff’s burden that the accommodation is “reasonable.”127 
After it was satisfied that Martin had met his burden, the court’s next step was to 
analyze whether the PGA Tour met its burden of proof that Martin’s use of a golf 
cart would “fundamentally alter” the nature of its public accommodation.128  If that 
                                                                
118Id. at 1247.  
119Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.  The PGA Tour stipulated to Martin’s disability, and to 
the fact that his disability prevents him from walking the course during a round of golf.  Id.  
One could argue against such stipulation.  See Part V, infra. 
120Id. at 1248. 
121Id. 
122Id.  The Senior PGA Tour is open only to competitors of fifty years of age or greater.  
Id. at 1249 n.9. 
123Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248. 
124Johnson v. Gambrinus Co. 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing guide dog to 
accompany blind patron on brewery tour), cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.   
125Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing Gambrinus, 116 F.3d at 1059). 
126Id. 
127Id.  The NCAA and the Pac-10 Conference were the two governing bodies that 
permitted Martin to use a golf cart while playing college golf for Stanford University in Palo 
Alto, California.  Id. 
128Id. at 1249. 
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burden is not satisfied in an ADA case, the defendant must provide the 
modification.129 
The PGA, citing Pottgen, stated that an individualized inquiry into the necessity 
of the walking rule here is inappropriate.130  The court cited Gambrinus,131  Crowder 
v. Kitagawa,132 and Stillwell v. Kansas City,133 in reaching its determination that “the 
ultimate question in this case is whether allowing plaintiff, given his individual 
circumstances, the requested modification would fundamentally alter PGA and Nike 
Tour competitions.”134 
The Martin court next tracked the terms of walking and golf cart use throughout 
The Rules of Golf, finding that nowhere is walking required or defined as essential to 
the game.135  It also noted that the USGA permits golf cart use unless otherwise 
prohibited.136  According to the “Transportation” portion of the Conditions of 
Competition and Local Rules promulgated by the PGA Tour, which governs the 
PGA and Nike Tour events, “Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated round 
unless permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee.”137  The court noted that 
there is no written policy regarding the determination of when a waiver of the 
walking requirement is appropriate.138  When the walking requirement has been 
waived, it has been waived for all players, and it has never been waived under 
individualized circumstances, such as Martin’s disability.139 
The court also went into excruciating detail through additional discussion of 
Martin’s disability, and the lengths Martin went, in order to play golf without a golf 
cart.140  The court, on two occasions, interjected an illustration of the similarity 
                                                                
129Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
130Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930-31, cited in Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
131Gambrinus,116 F. 3d 1059.  
13281 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that statewide carnivorous animal quarantine 
effectively prevented blind travelers from entering Hawaii, and without reasonable 
modification, quarantine violates ADA). 
133872 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that per se exclusion of one-handed 
applicants for armed security guard license is in violation of ADA and Constitutional due 
process rights). 
134Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
135Id.  THE RULES OF GOLF are promulgated by the USGA and the Royal and Ancient Golf 
Club of St. Andrews, Scotland.  Id. 
136Id. 
137Id. 
138Id.  
139Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249. 
140Id.  As stated above, the PGA does not contend the severity of Martin’s disability, or the 
extent to which it limits his ability to play golf without a golf cart.  See supra notes 48-50 and 
accompanying text. 
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between a disabled airline passenger and Martin, again overlooking the competitive 
nature of golf, and the lack of competition (by passengers) in air travel.141 
The court noted that the PGA’s stated purpose for the walking rule is “to inject 
the element of fatigue into the skill of shot-making.”142  It found that under the ADA, 
that purpose is “cognizable,” whereas if the PGA cited “tradition,” that would not 
have been a cognizable purpose.143  The court then went through an extensive 
analysis of walking while playing golf, only to determine that the fatigue factor is 
insignificant under normal circumstances.144  Testimony was offered at trial from 
which the court concluded that because walking is often chosen over riding in a golf 
cart on the Senior Tour and PGA qualifying rounds, walking must not inject 
additional fatigue into the competition as the PGA claimed.145 
Martin’s disability is so severe that the court found any fatigue which is injected 
into the competition has a more profound effect upon Martin, so he couldn’t be put at 
a competitive advantage by gaining the use of the golf cart.146  “The other golfers 
have to endure the psychological stress of competition as part of their fatigue; Martin 
has the same stress plus the added stress of pain and risk of serious injury.”147 
Before holding that the “requested accommodation of a cart is eminently 
reasonable in light of Casey Martin’s disability,”148 the court went through a 
hypothetical application of another one of The Rules of Golf to the ADA, again 
reaching the conclusion that the analysis of reasonableness must be on a 
individualized basis.149 
B.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
The PGA appealed the District Court decision to the Ninth Circuit.150  The Court 
of Appeals examined the same issues did the District Court, taking a detailed look at 
the terms “public accommodation,” and “reasonable modification.”151 
                                                                
141Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.  For fully developed version of this analogy, see id. at 
1247. 
142Id. at 1249. 
143Id. at 1250. 
144Id. 
145Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1251. 
146Id. 
147Id. at 1251-52.  The illogic of the court’s statement is astounding.  Obviously, all 
golfers do not compete with the same skill-set or physical attributes; that doesn’t mean the 
rules should be changed for some to compensate for the lack or presence of certain skills or 
attributes. 
148Id. at 1253. 
149Id. at 1252-53 (stating that a rule—intended purely for recreation golf—allowing a 
blind golfer to have a coach with him on the course requires the same individualized 
assessment as the cart rule of issue in Martin). 
150See generally Martin, 204 F.3d 994.  A three judge panel ruled on the PGA’s appeal of 
the Martin decision; the panel was composed of Senior Circuit Judge William C. Canby, who 
wrote for the court, Circuit Judge Thomas G. Nelson, and Judge Jeremy Fogel from the 
District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.  Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the definition of the term “public 
accommodation” differed from the District Court’s in one respect:  The Ninth Circuit 
ruled that even if the golf course does not qualify under “golf course . . . or other 
place of exercise or recreation,” it must qualify as “theater, stadium or other place of 
exhibition or entertainment.”152   
The court then cited a number of cases dealing with student-athletes to 
demonstrate how the ADA does indeed apply to athletics, but none deal with a 
substantive rule of competition.153  The only case cited by the court that even 
approaches waiving a substantive rule is Anderson v. Little League Baseball.154  In 
that case, the court held that Title III applies to the coaches’ box on a baseball field, 
but in no way implicates a player, let alone how that player would play the game.155 
The Ninth Circuit, much like the District Court below, also found that the ADA 
cannot be compartmentalized within a golf course.156  This court also stated that 
much like the PGA, private universities have very competitive entry standards, but 
that does not bar those universities from ADA enforcement.157 
The court held, and thereby unanimously affirmed the District Court’s ruling on 
the issue that golf courses remain places of public accommodation while a PGA 
Tournament is being held on them.158  The court did not “see any justification for 
drawing a line between use of a place of public accommodation for pleasure and use 
in the pursuit of a living.”159 
The court next explored whether the use of a golf cart by Martin is a “reasonable 
accommodation” under that ADA, or whether the accommodation would 
“fundamentally alter” the nature of goods or services of the PGA Tour.160  The court 
for the most part adopted the findings of the court below and found that they are not 
                                                          
151Id. 
152Martin, 204 F.3d at 997 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12187(7)(C) (1994)).  The PGA argued that 
tour golfers are not exercising or recreating—they are trying to win money, so the golf course 
doesn’t qualify under that provision of the ADA.  Id.  The court then mysteriously concluded, 
“[i]f a golf course during a tournament is not a place of exercise or recreation, then it is a place 
of exhibition or entertainment.”  Id.  Note, however, that just because an entity isn’t covered 
under one section of a statute, doesn’t automatically mean it is covered under another.  See 
note 93, supra. 
153Id. at 998 (citing Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. N.J. 1998) (academic 
ineligibility of football player); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998) 
(academic ineligibility of basketball player); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 
680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (academic ineligibility of swimmer); Anderson v. Little 
League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D. Ariz. 1992)). 
154794 F. Supp. 342. 
155Martin, 204 F.3d at 998 (citing Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 344).  
156Id. 
157Id. 
158Id. at 999. 
159Id. 
160Martin, 204 F.3d at 999. 
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clearly erroneous.161  It noted, however, that the District Court’s finding that the use 
of a golf cart does not provide a golfer with a competitive advantage over a golfer 
who walks, distinguishes this case from Olinger.162 
The court concluded through a de novo review, therefore, that under Title III of 
the ADA, a golf course is a place of public accommodation while the PGA is 
conducting a tournament.163  Additionally, the court found no errors in the 
determination of the court below that providing Martin with a golf cart was a 
reasonable accommodation that did not fundamentally alter the nature of the PGA 
and Nike Tour events, and thereby affirmed the lower court’s ruling.164 
C. United States  Supreme Court Decision 
1.  Majority Opinion 
On January 17, 2001, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Martin.165  
Although Olinger was not consolidated with Martin for purposes of this appeal, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Martin, in effect, controlled the outcome of Olinger.166  
On May 29, 2001, the Court released its opinion in Martin, affirming the Ninth 
Circuit decision.167  The Court’s decision, with Justice John Paul Stevens writing for 
the seven-to-two majority, focused on two questions:  “Whether the Act protects 
access to professional golf tournaments by a qualified entrant with a disability,” and 
“whether a disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf cart because it would 
‘fundamentally alter the nature’ of the tournaments … to allow him to ride when all 
other contestants must walk.”168 
With respect to the first question, the Court focused on whether the courses the 
PGA leases in order to hold their tournaments meet the ADA’s definition of “places 
of public accomodation,” and found that they “fit comfortably.”169  The Court also 
ruled that Martin fell within the Act’s protection as a statutory “individual.”170  The 
Court ruled that the PGA offers as one its “privileges” the chance to compete in 
qualifying school, and play in the tour events, and dismissed the PGA argument that 
the competitors in their tournaments are not the class protected by Title III.171  The 
Court, in fact, found the PGA offers “privileges” to two separate groups, those who 
                                                                
161Id. at 999-1001. 
162Id. at 1002 n.9 (citing Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 935). 
163Id. at 1002. 
164Id. 
165PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661 (2001); see also 2001 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 2. 
166See Olinger, 532 U.S. 1064 (granting certiorari, vacating the judgment of the Seventh 
Circuit, and remanding the case for consideration in light of Martin). 
167PGA Tour, 532 U.S. 661. 
168Id. at 664-65. 
169Id. at 677. 
170Id. 
171Id. at 677-78. 
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watch, and those who compete.172  The Court relied on Daniel v. Paul,173 Evans v. 
Laurel Links, Inc.174 and Wesley v. Savannah,175 to support the contention.176  In those 
cases, however, the “participants” were not professional athletes, but rather amateurs 
playing games for enjoyment, not profit.177  Furthermore, Daniel and Evans  
interpreted Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and were merely allowing access 
to the event, not changing the rules of it.178 
As to the second question, the Court ruled that providing Martin with a cart 
would not “fundamentally alter” PGA-sponsored events.179  The Court, without 
regard to the rule-making autonomy of professional (or amateur) sports 
organizations, began its discussion by noting that “the use of golf carts is not itself 
inconsistent with the fundamental character of the game of golf.”180  The Court next 
meandered through a history of golf, and its rules, to demonstrate its view that the 
walking rule is of limited import to the game, historically and presently.181  The 
PGA’s argument, however, is that at golf’s highest level, the PGA Tour, the purpose 
is “to assess and compare the performance of different competitors, a task that is 
meaningful only if the competitors are subject to identical substantive rules … [and 
that t]he waiver of any possibly ‘outcome-affecting’ rule for a contestant would 
violate this principle … [and thus] fundamentally alter the nature of the … event.”182  
The Court dismissed that claim, stating that the weather and luck play a role in 
determining the outcome, thereby mitigating the force of the PGA argument.183  
Ultimately, the Court determined that granting Martin a waiver of the walking rule 
would not fundamentally alter the PGA brand of tournament golf, and affirmed the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit.184 
                                                                
172PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 679-80. 
173Id. at 680 (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)). 
174PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474, 477 
(E.D. Va 1996)).  
175PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 
1969) 
176PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680 (citing Daniel, 395 U.S. at 306; Evans, 261 F. Supp. at 477; 
Wesley, 294 F. Supp. 698). 
177PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 680. 
178Id. (citing cases in notes 173-74, supra). 
179Id. at 689 (“[T]he walking rule is at best peripheral to the nature of [PGA] athletic 
events…”). 
180Id. at 683. 
181Id. at 683-88. 
182PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 686. 
183Id.  The dissent opines, “I guess that is why those who follow professional golfing 
consider Jack Nicklaus the luckiest golfer of all time, only to be challenged of late by the 
phenomenal luck of Tiger Woods….  ‘Pure chance’ is randomly distributed among the 
players, but allowing [Martin] to use a cart gives him a ‘lucky’ break every time he plays.”  Id. 
at 701-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
184Id. at 690-91. 
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2.  Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Antonin Scalia, however, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas joined, 
dissented from the Court’s opinion.185  Throughout a well-reasoned and superbly-
written opinion, Justice Scalia set forth logical arguments demonstrating how the 
Court’s “opinion exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it 
within [its] power to impose,” and, “distorts the text of Title III, the structure of the 
ADA, and common sense.”186 
Besides dissenting from the majority’s view on the effect of luck and chance on 
professional golf,187 the dissent also disagreed with the Court’s application of the 
terms “customer” and “client,” stating that under the majority’s application, the 
persons gathering at an auditorium would be covered by Title III, as would those 
who contracted to clean it.188  Similarly, the persons recreating at a zoo would be 
covered by Title III, as would the animal handlers bringing in the pandas.189  In 
addition, the dissent finds unreasonable the majority’s position that employees 
exempted from Title I coverage (i.e., independent contractors and employees of 
businesses employing fewer than fifteen persons) are covered under Title III because 
such employees “enjoy the employment and contracting that such places provide.”190  
The dissent also points out that Martin “did not seek to ‘exercise’ or ‘recreate’ at the 
PGA … events; he sought to make money (which is why he is called a professional 
golfer).”191  It is no surprise that the dissent concluded that it is impossible for 
athletes to be “customers” of the PGA, because that organization pays them.192 
The dissent also addressed what it found to be another grave error on the 
majority’s part, viz, its interpretation of, “access to.”193  The dissent stated the “PGA 
… cannot deny [Martin] access to [its] game because of his disability, but it need not 
provide him a game different (whether in its essentials or in its details) from that 
offered to everyone else.”194  The dissent also noted the statute was not designed to 
                                                                
185Id. at 691-705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
186PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 691. 
187See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
188PGA Tour, at 693. 
189Id. 
190Id. at 694.  See also supra note 93. 
191PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 696. 
192Id. at 697.  The dissent thoroughly analyzed this point.  See, e.g., id. at 695.  (“[N]o one 
in his right mind would think that [baseball players] are customers of the American League or 
of Yankee Stadium.  They are themselves the entertainment that the customers pay to 
watch.”); see also id. at 697 (“By the Court’s reasoning, a business exists not only to sell 
goods and services to the public, but to provide the ‘privilege’ of employment to the public, 
wherefore it follows, like night the day, that everyone who seeks a job is a customer.”). 
193Id. at 703. 
194PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 699.  On this point, the dissent states, in discussing whether shoe 
stores must sell single shoes for one-legged persons, that there is “no basis for considering 
whether the rules of … competition must be altered.  It is as irrelevant to the PGA’s … 
compliance with the statute whether walking is essential to the game of golf as it is to [a] shoe 
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ensure that Martin’s “disability will not deny him an equal chance to win 
competitive sporting events.”195  In concluding its opinion, the dissent offers this 
statement, which aptly summarizes its position: 
Agility, strength, speed, balance, quickness of mind, steadiness of nerves, 
intensity of concentration—these talents are not evenly distributed. No 
wild-eyed dreamer has ever suggested that the managing bodies of the 
competitive sports that test precisely these qualities should try to take 
account of the uneven distribution of God-given gifts when writing and 
enforcing the rules of competition. And I have no doubt Congress did not 
authorize misty-eyed judicial supervision of such a revolution.196 
IV.  OLINGER V. USGA 
A.  District Court Decision 
The case of Ford Olinger was, for some reason, much less publicized than that of 
Casey Martin.  Olinger, like Martin, is a professional golfer with a physical 
impairment.197  Olinger, a club pro from Warsaw, Indiana,198 was eligible for, and 
desired to, compete in, the 1999 U.S. Open qualifying rounds held at South Bend 
Country Club in Indiana.199  The U.S. Open is one of thirteen national championships 
conducted by the USGA each year.200  The USGA prohibits the use of golf carts in 
the Open, and in the qualifying rounds that precede it.201 
Olinger suffers from bilateral avascular necrosis, which significantly impairs his 
ability to walk, and makes a golf cart necessary for the completion of an eighteen 
hole round of golf.202  Thus, Olinger filed suit against the USGA under Title III of 
the ADA, seeking an order allowing him to use a golf cart while competing in the 
U.S. Open qualifying rounds.203 
                                                          
store’s compliance whether ‘pairness’ is essential to the nature of shoes.”  Id. at 698 (quoting 
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999).  Further, Scalia offered, 
“[w]hy cannot the PGA …, if it wishes, promote a new game, with distinctive rules (much as 
the American League promotes a game of baseball in which the pitcher’s turn at the plate can 
be taken by a designated hitter?”  Id. at 699. 
195Id. at 703. 
196Id. at 703-04. 
197Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
198Lithwick, supra note 7, at 22. 
199Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 929. 
200Id. at 928. 
201Id. at 929. 
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The District Court opinion is divided into two parts: One that is based on the 
motion for summary judgment filed by the USGA, and the other based on a bench 
trial.204 
1.  Motion for Summary Judgment 
The USGA argued that the U.S. Open is not “public,” nor is it a “place,” so it 
certainly could not be a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA.205  Since 
the USGA does allow certain amateurs to participate in the U.S. Open and its 
qualifying rounds, the court does find that it is “public.”206 
Olinger claimed that although the USGA is literally not a “place,” it does, for the 
purposes of conducting its championships, “operate[s] a place of public 
accommodation,” as provided for in the statute.207  Thus, the court concluded, due to 
the control the USGA has over the courses before, during, and after its tournaments, 
that it does indeed operate a place of public accommodation, therefore falling under 
the control of Title III of the ADA.208 
The USGA also argued that the competition areas of the U.S. Open and its 
qualifying rounds is off limits to the general public, so only the spectator areas 
should be governed by the ADA.209  The court cited a number of cases where the 
NCAA ruled on the eligibility of college student-athletes, and the courts did not find 
that the competitive areas—i.e. pool, court, or field—were outside the reach of the 
ADA.210  In each of these cases, however, eligibility pending upon the plaintiff’s 
ability to perform academically, not athletically, was the issue. 
The USGA also argued that it should be enabled, as an organizer of a 
championship event, to make its own rules of competition.  It cited New York 
Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Resources,211 “which held that 
because the New York City Marathon is a footrace, its organizers had no obligation 
to allow other means of locomotion. . . .”212  The plaintiff countered, saying that if 
that were to be so, sports would become the only industry “allowed to construct 
barriers to access that are unrelated to performance.”213  The court called this 
argument “simply another version of [the USGA] argument that [it] is exempt from 
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205Id. 
206Id. 
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 432 N.E.2d 780 (N.Y. 1982). 
212Olinger, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
213Id. at 933. 
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the provisions of the ADA,” and denied the USGA’s motion for summary 
judgment.214 
2.  Trial 
The issue pursued at trial was the USGA’s argument that the accommodation that 
Olinger requested, a golf cart, would fundamentally alter the nature of the U.S. Open 
and its qualifying rounds.215  The court, following trial, agreed with the USGA.216 
As the court pointed out, “fundamentally alter” comes from Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis,217 a case under the Rehabilitation Act218 that interpreted 
“reasonable accommodation.”219  The Rehabilitation Act language is so similar to the 
ADA, that the “reasonable accommodations” analysis is “easily transferable to the 
Title III . . . context.”220   
The court examined the initial burden, on the plaintiff, to provide that the 
accommodation is reasonable in the general sense, noting that the “golf cart has 
become so ubiquitous in the sport that any such challenge would seem doomed.”221  
That being established, the USGA must prove that the accommodation would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament: “Proof must focus on the specific 
circumstances rather than on reasonableness in general.”222  Thus, the USGA must 
show that the use of a golf cart in U.S. Open and its qualifying rounds would 
fundamentally alter the competition. 
The USGA claimed that since the U.S. Open is the national golf championship, 
the standards for competition must be higher than those of its other tournaments.223  
For instance, its U.S. Senior Open, in which competitors are at least fifty-five years 
old or more, is not a test of stamina like the U.S. Open.224  Also, other tournaments 
that do not bestow the winner with “national champion” status do allow golf carts, 
but often that is due to the fact that the tournaments are held during school months, 
thus there is a shortage of students to act as caddies.225  As a result, “the court sees no 
inconsistency in . . . allowing carts in some events while barring them in what they 
view as the national championship.”226  Through the court’s findings, many derived 
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from a study of walking fatigue while playing golf reported by an expert 
physiologist, Dr. James Rippe, show “not that a golfer who rides invariably has a 
competitive advantage over a very similar golfer who walks; . . . only that a strong 
possibility exists that on any particular day, such a competitive advantage might 
exist, and that it might be substantial.”227 
The court also noted that even a slight competitive advantage could affect the 
outcome of the U.S. Open.  “Slightly over 100 U.S. Opens have been played, and on 
30 occasions, a playoff was needed to decide the winner, so a single stroke can be 
determinative.”228  Additionally, although the court conceded this was not part of the 
trial record, “a single stroke would have an impact on money won or lost below the 
levels of first and second places.”229 
The court was also cautious about the precedent it would set if it allowed Olinger 
the use of a golf cart, stating that if the “inquiry moves beyond . . . Olinger, the issue 
broadens and becomes more difficult . . . Olinger must ride a golf cart to play, and 
even with a cart he is likely to be more fatigued at the end [of a round] than a healthy 
Tiger Woods or healthy David Duval.”230  The court anticipated that later someone 
else may apply for a golf cart, and the same thing will be said: 
But how will that applicant be compared to Ford Olinger?  Will next 
year’s applicant . . . have a competitive advantage over Olinger if allowed 
to ride?  Will Mr. Olinger have a competitive advantage over next year’s 
applicant if both are allowed to ride?  If either would have an advantage 
over the other, would one be allowed to ride? or both? or neither?231 
The court also noted that it was able to decide whether Olinger was to use a golf 
cart with the help of many attorneys who provided far more information to the court 
then it ultimately needed, in the form of briefs, testimony, and other evidence.232  It 
also noted that the USGA does not ask for all of the information that these skilled 
attorneys were able to provide.233  Of course it could, “but the USGA then also would 
need to develop a system and a fund of expertise to determine whether a given 
applicant truly needs, or merely wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart 
to compete.”234 
“It is important . . . not to allow ‘stamina’ or ‘nature of the program’ to become a 
proxy for discrimination against persons protected by the ADA.”235  However, the 
court stated that, unlike the workplace, 
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The point of athletic competition . . . is to decide who, under conditions 
that are about the same for everyone, can perform an assigned set of tasks 
better than . . . any other competitor.  The set of tasks assigned to the 
competitor in the U.S. Open includes not merely striking a golf ball with 
precision, but doing so under greater than usual mental and physical 
stress.236 
As a result, the district court held that, although the accommodation Olinger 
sought was reasonable in a general sense, granting it would fundamentally alter the 
nature of the competition in the U.S. Open.237 
B.  Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision 
After the District Court’s ruling, Olinger appealed the decision to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.238  The nature of Olinger’s appeal centers on the evidence 
that the USGA offered at trial.  He contended that it lacked a nexus between his 
“personal circumstances as they interacted with the USGA’s event—that in fact 
allowing a cart would fundamentally alter the event.”239  Olinger also asserted that 
the USGA did not show that “impossible administrative burdens” would be imposed 
upon it if it were to allow Olinger to use a golf cart.240  The court began its analysis 
of the Olinger case with an extensive background of the history and tradition of the 
U.S. Open, reaching the conclusion that “the U.S. Open is the greatest test in golf.”241  
The court asserted that, as the District Court did, this case can be resolved upon the 
narrow issue of whether Olinger’s “use of a cart during the tournament would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.”242 
The court then thoroughly analyzed Title III provisions and its key terminology 
much like the court below had done, finding that the use of a golf cart by Olinger 
“would alter the fundamental nature of that competition . . .” by removing a 
“particular type of stamina.”243  The testimony of three witnesses, Ken Venturi, Dr. 
Theodore Holland, and Dennis Hepler, are relied on in the court’s opinion as 
evidence of the above finding.244  Venturi, the 1964 U.S. Open champion, testified at 
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trial to the conditions he overcame to win the tournament that year, as well as the 
story of Ben Hogan’s dramatic victory in 1950.245 
Dr. Holland testified that physical endurance and stamina are vital factors in 
determining the U.S. Open champion, saying that “[t]here is a lot more to getting . . . 
around those seventy-two holes than just hitting the shots.”246  Much like Holland, 
Olinger’s own witness, Hepler,  “testified that physical endurance and stamina and 
uniform rules are critical factors in determining the national golf champion.”247 
The court, in closing, and without discussion, adopted the District Court’s 
holding that to require the USGA to examine each request for a golf cart would 
impose undue administrative burdens upon it.248 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the court below, and noted that it 
is not deciding whether the “USGA should give seriously disabled . . . golfers a 
chance to compete,” but rather are required to do so.249  Ultimately, the court held 
they will not grant Olinger’s request for a golf cart, “[b]ecause the law does not force 
the USGA to make the accommodation Olinger seeks.”250 
V.  MARTIN AND OLINGER DO NOT MEET THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF DISABLED 
With the publicity that is attached to an attraction such as professional golf, it 
was not long before scholars weighed in on the decisions reached in both Martin and 
Olinger.  Some found the golfers’ claims reasonable, and others said that “big 
brother again undermined a private organization’s ability to set its own rules.”251 
As noted above, the PGA stipulated to Martin’s disability, which is the plaintiff’s 
initial burden when filing an ADA claim.252  After hearing of his condition, one has 
little doubt that Martin is disabled.  Or is he?  Similarly, the USGA stipulated to 
Olinger’s disability,253 and the Social Security Administration has determined that 
Olinger is disabled, but those regulations have nothing to do with the ADA.254  One 
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scholar asserts that both Martin and Olinger, as professional athletes, may not even 
qualify as “disabled” under the ADA, making any claim under that law doomed from 
the outset.255 
Under the ADA, a person must meet three necessary elements to qualify as 
disabled: (1) “physical or mental impairment” that (2) “substantially limits” a (3) 
“major life activity.”256  Clearly, both golfers have “physical impairments,” but does 
either substantially limit a major life activity? 
There are no specific criteria for “major life activity” provided by either the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or Congress.257  However, the “major 
life activities” that they have recognized share three characteristics, which have been 
described as a “Frequency-Universality Test.”258  An activity meets this test, and 
thereby qualifies as a “major life activity,” if it is performed with microfrequency 
(throughout the day), macrofrequency (daily or almost daily), and universally (by 
almost everyone, except those prevented from doing so by an impairment).259   
Under that test, query what possible “major life activity” are these two men being 
prevented from doing?  Walking, golfing, or golfing professionally are three 
possibilities.  If the claim is that the “major life activity” is walking, are both 
plaintiffs “substantially limited” as the statute requires?  Consider that both men do 
indeed walk while playing a round of golf; that is, they do not hit their shots from the 
golf cart.  They must still walk from the golf cart to the ball and back, which, it is 
estimated, is still twenty-five percent of the course, or roughly one and one-quarter 
miles for a round of eighteen holes.260 It is reasonable to assume, for the sake of 
argument, that these two professionals play golf six days per week.  If so, that is 
roughly seven and one-half miles of walking per week during golf alone.  It is 
doubtful that this would qualify under the universal prong of the test, for few persons 
walk that far on a weekly basis. 
With the next two possibilities, golf, and more narrowly, professional golf, the 
prospect of either of these men satisfying the test becomes increasingly remote.  The 
typical golfer may, and usually does, spend large amounts of time at his or her game, 
but the number of able-bodied persons participating in golf could hardly be termed 
“universal.”  By even greater logic, the argument that professional golf is a “major 
life activity” becomes impossible to make.  “In fact, even though professional 
athletes . . . may participate in sports for a large portion of the day, every day, 
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participation in sports must fail the universality test because unimpaired people 
commonly choose not to participate in sports.”261  Thus, there is a distinct 
“possibility that in cases where the disability is not stipulated and where courts 
require that a plaintiff prove the disability [while] further requiring a showing that a 
major life activity is substantially limited, the professional athlete may run into 
difficulty.”262 
Another possible “major life activity,” as it applies to these cases is “working.”  
Even though neither court found grounds for a Title I claim,263 which covers 
employee/employer relationships under the ADA, that does not preclude the 
determination of “working” as a major life activity.  It stands to reason that even if 
both plaintiffs are judged to be independent contractors, rather than employees of the 
respective defendants, both could still be considered to be working as they compete 
for the tournament purse. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, analyzed the statutory 
definition of disabled.264  The Court determined “[w]hen the major life activity under 
consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires, 
at minimum, that Plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs.”265  The Court also looked to the EEOC’s definition of “substantially limits” as 
applied to the major life activity of working, which states “[t]he inability to perform 
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life 
activity of working.”266  The Court concluded, therefore, “[i]f jobs utilizing an 
individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not 
precluded from a substantial class of jobs.  Similarly, if a host of different types of 
jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.”267  Since Olinger 
works as a club pro, and Martin is a graduate of Stanford University with a degree in 
economics, neither appears to be limited from a broad class of jobs.268 
Sutton therefore held that the Plaintiffs—who claimed the Defendants failure to 
hire them as commercial airline pilots because of poor vision was a Title I 
violation—were not “disabled” under the ADA’s meaning.269  Applying the Court’s 
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analysis to Martin and Olinger, absent stipulations to the respective Plaintiff’s 
disabilities, and extending the definition of “major life activity” that the high Court 
used in its Title I claim to our Title III claims, it is likely, again, that Martin and 
Olinger would fail to meet the ADA definition of “disabled.” 
VI.  SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF ATHLETICS WERE NOT MEANT TO BE  
GOVERNED BY THE ADA 
Another argument not presented at length in the analysis of either court, but 
mentioned briefly in Olinger, is that the ADA should not apply to the competitive 
component of athletics.  “The point of an athletic competition . . . is to decide who, 
under conditions that are about the same for everyone, can perform an assigned set of 
tasks better than (not as well as) any other competitor.”270  Athletics present a far 
different question than do workplace claims under Title I, in which “the pertinent 
inquiry is whether a particular otherwise qualified individual can perform a job if a 
reasonable accommodation is made to allow for the person’s disability.”271  Title III 
prohibits eligibility criteria that “screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a 
disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying any goods [and] services . . ..”272  
Professional athletics isn’t about “enjoyment” and access; it is about competition and 
huge winnings.  The Title III claims presented by these two golfers not only ask for 
access, but also for the chance to compete and win.273 
[I]t is . . . without question that . . . Martin’s use of a cart places him in a 
much better position than if he were forced to compete without the use of 
a cart.  Given the format of professional golf . . . allowing . . . Martin to 
use a cart during competitive play will undoubtedly permit him to finish 
higher, thereby receiving a greater winning.274 
An important difference between all of the ADA cases that are cited in support of 
the plaintiff in Martin, many of which are NCAA eligibility cases, is that they 
regulate the access athletics, while Martin and Olinger want the rules changed after 
they have already gained access.  “What is most threatening to professional sports 
about the Martin decision is not that [he] was given the opportunity to compete on 
the professional level, but rather that a court altered competition in order to do so.”275 
Adam Jay Golden, writing in the Sports Law Journal, sets forth an excellent 
example of how judicial interference with the substantive, competitive rules of golf 
could present itself in other sports; he used baseball as an example.276  Golden asks 
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you to assume that a Major League Baseball (“MLB”) pitcher has the same disorder 
as Martin, and that he has all the skills necessary to be a MLB pitcher, but he cannot 
remain standing for long periods of time.277  “In order to continue competing in 
professional baseball, the pitcher requests that MLB permit him to place a chair next 
to the pitcher’s mound so that he may sit when he is in the act of pitching.”278  This is 
an obviously absurd mental picture. 
Most people who know anything about baseball would agree that placing a chair 
in the middle of a baseball diamond is a ridiculous accommodation.  The same 
people will also tell you that standing for long periods of time is not a skill that is 
fundamental to becoming a big league pitcher.  Nonetheless, Golden correctly states 
that if you were to go through the same ADA analysis as in Martin, you may find 
yourself watching a game that features a folding chair as part of the baseball 
landscape.279  For even though the accommodation of a “chair on a baseball diamond 
is more foreign than that of a golf cart on a golf course, the oddity of such an 
accommodation would not alter the legal analysis . . . .”280  The Martin court, for 
instance, ruled that the purpose of any rule cannot be mere tradition.281  So, MLB 
could not offer such argument, nor an argument of unsightliness, to defeat this 
hypothetical accommodation.282 
The Supreme Court made a similar argument during oral arguments in Martin.283  
The Court cited the designated hitter rule in MLB as an illustration of how a sport 
can be played under two different sets of rules, just like in professional golf.284  In the 
American League, one of the two MLB leagues, the pitcher is replaced in the batting 
order by a designated hitter; yet in the National League the pitcher bats.  The Court 
asked Martin’s attorney, Roy L. Reardon of New York, if a pitcher with a blood 
deficiency that causes him to tire easily should be entitled to relief from hitting if he 
played in the National League, because the designated hitter rule couldn’t be 
“fundamental” since it is in only one of the Major Leagues.285  Reardon responded 
that the National League rule requiring the pitcher to bat is fundamental, and 
changing that rule would be impermissible.286 
The Court, unable to tell the difference between the PGA golf cart rule and the 
American League designated hitter rule, responded that it couldn’t understand “the 
whole meaning of fundamentalness with regard to sport.”287  It then asked the 
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Respondent if a player had a disability that caused an unusually long torso, could 
baseball change the strike zone, which is normally from the knees to the chest, and 
make it smaller for him.288  Reardon again responded that the strike zone is a 
fundamental rule.289  The Court responded by calling the strike zone a “silly rule,” 
and saying “[a]ll sports rules are silly rules. . . .”290  Clearly, the point the Court was 
trying to make is that all sports are governed by rules that are arbitrarily created to 
put all competitors on a level playing field and test them—not to discriminate against 
disabled people.  Granted, a person born with unusually short arms would be 
discriminated against if he were to try out for quarterback of a football team.  A 
dwarf would be discriminated against if he were to try out for a basketball team; that 
is the very nature of athletics. 
Sometimes hyperbole is the only way to make an argument effective; sometimes 
extending an apparently logical argument to an extreme shows how it is actually 
illogical.  The above examples demonstrate the primary point of Olinger, that the 
purpose of athletics is to compete under the same conditions, and then see who is 
victorious.  An extension of Martin changes that goal; hence, the ADA should not 
apply to competitive athletics. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
After reading the above, it is understandable how many people would cry that the 
PGA is being cold-hearted, and how they should allow Martin to compete.  It is a 
terrible condition that he suffers from; likewise, Olinger suffers from a condition that 
severely curtails his ability to walk.  Moreover, there are many other persons quietly 
suffering from terrible medical conditions, which have no cure, who cannot even 
find work, let alone compete in professional athletics. 
The ADA is not a panacea for those who wish to participate in professional 
sports.  Nor was its design to ensure that this nation went without suffering.  The 
ADA was implemented to ensure that disabled Americans could get into the 
factories, movie houses, and ballparks of their communities.  Most of the cases cited 
in support by both golfers are those which an athlete gained access to an event that 
he would have been barred from were it not for the ADA.  This Note’s primary 
contention is that access is where the ADA needs to stop—before it changes the 
substantive rules, and consequently, the overall nature, of athletics.  Nowhere did 
Martin, Olinger, nor any of the courts cite a case that even proposed that rules of 
competition should be changed so an athlete can compete.  Nevertheless, in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin,  the “world of professional sports may 
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forever be altered.”291  But rest assured, “[t]he year was 2001, and ‘everybody was 
finally equal.’”292 
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